Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 41 | Number 2

Article 9

1-1-2000

Book Review [Law's Order: What Economics Has
to Do with Law and Why It Matters]
Santa Clara Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Santa Clara Law Review, Book Review, Book Review [Law's Order: What Economics Has to Do with Law and Why It Matters], 41 Santa
Clara L. Rev. 643 (2000).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol41/iss2/9

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

BOOK REVIEW

Law's Order: What Economics Has to Do with Law and
Why It Matters. By David D. Friedman. Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000. Pp. 312. Hardcover. $29.95.
Reviewed by Thomas S. Ulen*
I. INTRODUCTION

It is commonplace in the legal academy today that law
and economics (or the economic analysis of law) is the default
style of legal scholarship. Indeed, as a good friend of mine-a
law professor at a prominent law school-told me recently,
"We have won." There are, in fact, objective measures of this
success.' Although this success is evident to those of us who
teach in law schools, it is perhaps not as clear to non-lawyers
within the academy, to lawyers and judges outside the legal
academy, or to the general, well-informed public. Even
among those who are not aware of the rise of law and economics in the academy, there is a sense that the legal profession is in a transition phase. And within the legal profession
there have been, it is true, concerns that what goes on in the
law schools is becoming increasingly less related to what
practitioners need. That is, the profession and the scholars
appear to be moving in opposite directions.
* Ph.D., Stanford University; B.A., University of Oxford; B.A., Dartmouth
College. The author is Alumni Distinguished Professor, College of Law, and
Professor, Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign.
1. See William Landes & Richard Posner, The Influence of Economics on
Law: A Quantitative Study, 26 J.L. & ECON. 385 (1993); Robert C. Ellickson,
Trends in Legal Scholarship:A Statistical Study, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 517 (2000).
2. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); see also Symposium,
Legal Education, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1921 (1993); Harry T. Edwards, The Grow-
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These developments in the style of legal scholarship and
the concerns they have raised in the profession have given
rise to a desire to describe the state of affairs, to explain why
it has happened, and to bridge the gap somehow.' Whether
that is possible or even desirable is beyond the scope of this
review. Nonetheless, as I say, there is a desire to describe
and explain the changes in legal scholarship. There are now
a significant number of texts in law and economics,4 but their
number is no longer growing. That stasis in the number of
textual treatments should not be taken as an indication that
law and economics has reached or even passed its high-tide
mark and will now begin to recede, as have other legal scholarly innovations before it. Quite to the contrary, the fact that
there are no or few new textual treatments of the field appearing should, I believe, be taken as a sign of how profound
the success of law and economics in the academy has been.
The reason that I make this claim is that I believe that law
and economics has become so central to legal scholarship and
education that it is being incorporated into the textual treatment of individual subjects within law and disappearing as a
separate field of study. For instance, fifteen years ago one
could have written a monograph on the economic treatment of
tort liability and have confidently expected that monograph to

ing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession:A Postscript,
91 MICH. L. REV. 2191 (1993); Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalizationof
Legal Teaching and Scholarship,91 MICH. L. REV. 1921 (1993).
3. See DEAN ANTHONY KRONMAN'S, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF

THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993) was an eloquent attempt to point out how and
why the gap between the academy and the profession had arisen. Dean Kronman lays a great deal of the blame on the rise of law and economics in the academy. I have argued elsewhere that I think that this perception of law and economics is mistaken (see Thomas S. Ulen, The Prudence of Law and Economics:
Why More Economics Is Better, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 773 (1996)) in that it misperceives law and economics as antithetical to what Dean Kronman characterizes
as the practical wisdom that characterized the legal profession decades ago. My
take, for what it is worth, is that law and economics fosters, rather than undermines, that practical wisdom.
4. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998);
ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS S. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (3d ed. 1999);
THOMAS J. MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW: TORTS, CONTRACTS, PROPERTY,
LITIGATION (1997). A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1989) is, perhaps, the most accessible of the textual treatments and is, truly, an introduction and not a comprehensive treatment.
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have been read by only a handful of torts scholars, by almost
no other law professors, and by no law students.' Today
nearly every law student in the United States picks up the
economic analysis of torts as a matter of course during her introductory course in that subject. Similarly, law students
who study contract law today begin with the notion of "efficient breach" and find that notions of risk allocation, principal-agent relationships, and the least-cost-avoider are central
to the study of contractual law. In brief, law and economics
has now become so much a part of the core teaching in the
central subjects of the law that the need for a separate course
in the economic analysis of law is less compelling than it was,
say, ten years ago.
I do not want to oversell my contention that, as my friend
says, law and economics has "won" to the exclusion of other
styles of legal scholarship. We are not at the legal equivalent
of the "end of history" in which everyone agrees that law and
economics is the method of legal analysis. Doctrinal analysis
as a method of scholarship and the case method as a style of
teaching are still vigorously alive in many law schools. And
there are still significant areas of the law that have escaped
infection by the law-and-economics virus (such as constitutional law); there are still issues of disagreement between
conventional legal scholars and law-and-economics scholars
about important theoretical matters; there are even disagreements among law-and-economics proponents about core
issues in law and economics;6 and there is still much work to
5. Indeed, three prominent law-and-economics scholars did just that:
WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW (1987) and STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW
(1987).

6. For example, some law-and-economics scholars, such as Posner pere and
Posner fils, believe that the rational choice theory of human decisionmaking,
taken as a whole and without modification from microeconomic theory, is the
best theory from which to undertake the economic analysis of law. Others believe that rational choice theory needs to import significantly more constraints
on human decisionmaking, at least in the context of legal decisionmaking.
These additional constraints, the critics allege, arise from the perception that
there are widespread cognitive imperfections that make rational choice theory,
without modification to take account of these imperfections, a sometimesmisleading guide to legal decisionmaking. See e.g. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assump-
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be done in law and economics to make it better and more acceptable.' Still, law and economics is on a high plateau in its
history.
Into this state of affairs comes Professor David Friedman's Law's Order: What Economics Has To Do With the Law
and Why It Matters. I have gone into the current state of affairs in the legal academy vis-A-vis law and economics because a great deal of what I have to say about Professor
Friedman's book must be seen against this background. Although I have a great affection and admiration for the work,
such critical things as I shall have to say will arise largely
from my concerns about where the book fits into the history,
present, and future of law and economics. For example, in
view of where law and economics stands in the legal academy
and the profession today, I shall wonder about the audience
that Professor Friedman might be addressing or ought to address. To speculate on that, however, will first require me to
describe the book and its qualities, a task to which I turn in
the next section.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF LAWs ORDER
David Friedman, Professor of Law and of Economics at
Santa Clara University, has written a sprightly introduction
to the field of law and economics.8 The book is, in essence, divided into three sections. The first 100 pages or so are an introduction to some central concepts of economics, with application to legal topics. The next 100 pages focus on the
economic analysis of private law issues-property, contracts,
tion from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000).
7. I believe that the two most important issues that law and economics will
face in the near future are (1) the empirical and experimental testing of its
many hypotheses about the law, and (2) the elaboration of a more broad-gauge
theory of human decisionmaking.
8. Professor Friedman has a Ph.D. in physics from the University of Chicago and an undergraduate degree in chemistry and physics from Harvard. But
he is apparently an economist by dint of genes and upbringing in that he is the
son of Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman. Professor Friedman is also the author
of Hidden Order: The Economics of Everyday Life (1996), a wonderful introduc-

tion to intermediate microeconomic (or price) theory. A much earlier book of
his, The Machinery of Freedom: A Guide to Radical Capitalism (1981), is a clas-

sic libertarian tract.
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and torts. The final 100 pages treat the public law areas of
antitrust and criminal law. And within each of these areas
Professor Friedman's aim is not to give an economic treatment of the entire area of that area but rather to give a selective treatment that shows the economic analysis of that area
in the best possible light.
A. The Organizationof the Work
The introductory material on economics is no substitute
for a serious study of price theory, but it is a helpful survey of
selected tools. There are, for instance, discussions of how,
why, and when to perform cost-benefit analysis and of the
creation of value through mutually beneficial exchange, one of
the most central issues in an understanding of price theory
but one of the hardest for non-economists to grasp. Chapter 2
treats efficiency as a legal norm--once a very controversial
topic-and does so in a very even-handed manner. Professor
Friedman tells the reader the limitations of the notion of efficiency-for instance, that it is a consequentialist idea (one
valued for the consequences of accepting it) and not a fundamental idea (as is the notion of the "right" or the "good"). Another shortcoming of the standard of efficiency, he writes, is
that to be operational it must rely on the willingness to pay
as its measure of consumer value. He correctly, in my opinion, relies on Marshallian notions of efficiency-notions that
may be better known as "Kaldor-Hicks" or "potential Pareto"
efficiency.9 He introduces the more conventional economic
9. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency stands in contrast to Pareto efficiency, which is
the more fundamental economic concept of efficiency. An allocation of goods
and services is "Pareto efficient" if it is impossible to reallocate the current
holdings among the current holders so as to make one or more people better off
(in their own estimation) without making someone else worse off (again in his or
her own estimation). That is, under Pareto, efficiency reallocations must be
consensual-the losers must be compensated by the winners so that there is a
clear net gain from any reallocation. An allocation that cannot be consensually
altered is said to be "Pareto efficient" or "Pareto optimal." "Kaldor-Hicks efficiency" is an easier standard under which to reallocate goods and services. Under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion a reallocation is superior if the winners could
have compensated the losers, but they do not have to do so. In essence, this criterion recommends changes on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis: if the benefits of a reallocation exceed the costs, then the reallocation is Kaldor-Hicks efficient. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 4, at 12, 43-44.
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standard-Pareto efficiency-late in the chapter, and, again
correctly, I believe, does not make much of it."°
Chapters 3 and 4 strike a delightful note of lightheartedness that is, pleasingly, maintained throughout the book.
Professor Friedman entitled those chapters "What's Wrong
with the World, Parts 1 and 2" and, in Chapter 4, one of the
sections has the whimsical title--"Nothing Works, Everything
Works, It All Depends." Chapter 4 has a nice exposition of
the Coase Theorem, one of the great intellectual achievements of the twentieth century and a crucial concept in all of
law and economics. For my taste, there is far too little of the
examples that Coase himself used and that have become such
a bedrock part of the law-and-economics literature-such as
the farmer-rancher example." There is, however, extensive
later use made of the railroad-farmer example. 2
The material on property rules versus liability rules is, I
think, strange. The issue of remedies arises in Chapter 5
("Defining and Enforcing Rights: Property, Liability, and
Spaghetti"), where the injuries that the sparks from a passing
railroad train could inflict on a neighboring farm are the
subject of inquiry. The various methods of minimizing the
costs arising from these potentially conflicting interests-the
farmer's planting fewer crops or planting them farther away
from the tracks; the railroad's installing a spark arrester; the
farmer switching to a fire-resistant crop-are examined in an
almost incomprehensible diagram on page forty-nine. The
10. See id. (discussing Pareto efficiency and how it contrasts with KaldorHicks efficiency).
11. The situation is one in which a rancher runs cattle and his neighbor
grows crops. The cattle might stray onto the neighboring crops, causing damage
to the farmer. Professor Coase asked whether the efficient use of resources by
the rancher and the farmer would be affected by the legal regime that defined
the legal relationships between the neighboring property owners. His answer
was that if transaction costs between the potentially conflicting property owners
are zero, an efficient use of resources will prevail, regardless of the legal regime.
See Ronald A. Coase, The Problemof Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
12. The situation is that a railroad passing through farm territory emits
sparks that might damage the crops growing beside the tracks. Again, Professor Coase asked if the legal regime for defining liability for crop damage from
passing railroad sparks would affect the efficient use of railroad and farm property. As in the rancher-farmer example (and, incidentally, in every other legal
example), the answer, known as the Coase Theorem, is that the legal regime
will have no effect on efficient resource use when transaction costs are zero.
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dimensions of the problems that the diagram creates for the
reader are to be imagined from the title of the figure: "Spaghetti diagram." I cannot think that any student would be
willing to pour over that diagram in search of legal enlightenment.
The treatment of property rules versus liability rules illustrates what I believe to be a problem with Law's Order.
The economic analysis of legal and equitable remedies is one
of the most important topics in all of law and economics, falling just below the Coase Theorem in order of importance.
And yet there is no mention of the famous article that gave
rise to that analysis."3 It is not only true and important but
also comforting to know that we in the academy are building
on the work of others. We have, therefore, a duty to teach not
only the substance of the ideas in our field but also to tell our
readers and students whence these wonderful ideas come. To
do so instructs readers and students of the continuity in the
intellectual endeavor-itself an important idea-and the need
to rely on the great work of one's predecessors and contemporaries. As Isaac Newton said, "If I have been able to see further, it is because I stood on the shoulders of giants."" One
must also instruct readers and students into the literature
that every learned person in the profession needs to know.
Just as every student of English literature ought to know
Shakespeare and to have read his work and every philosophy
student ought to know Aristotle and what he wrote, every
student of law and economics should know Ronald Coase and
his "The Problem of Social Cost" and Calabresi and Melamed
and their "One View of the Cathedral." I emphatically do not
mean that Professor Friedman is unaware of the articles that
created the field; I am merely chiding him for not having
mentioned them explicitly."3

13. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089
(1972).
14. See generally ROBERT K. MERTON ET AL., ON THE SHOULDERS OF
GIANTS: A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT (1965) (tracing the origins of this metaphor

in a letter from Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke).
15. See infra Part II.B (returning to this issue with a discussion of the textInternet link).
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Professor Friedman organizes some of the material in the
introductory third of the book not by conventional economic or
legal topic but around a single problem. For example, Chapter 6 ("Of Burning Houses and Exploding Coke Bottles") deals
with insurance. The familiar topics are here-attitudes towards risk, moral hazard, adverse selection-and they are
presented with clarity and sprightliness.
Similarly, Chapter 7 ("Coin Flips and Car Crashes: Ex
Post versus Ex Ante") treats some issues that Professor
Friedman finds particularly compelling and that was the basis of one of his many scholarly articles. 6 That article and
this chapter make some important points, but these points
are likely to be of interest to the specialist in law and economics and not to the most likely audience for this book.
That criticism having been made, I cannot resist adding that
although I think the material in this chapter is somewhat out
of place, I found his discussion of impossible attempts to be
wonderfully entertaining and instructive.17 The issue, a familiar one to those first wrestling with the concepts of criminal law, is whether the law should punish an attempt to
achieve an illegal result when the method being used cannot
possibly achieve that result. For instance, suppose that I, furious with someone for some wrong she has done me, seek to
harm her by putting pins into a voodoo doll meant to represent her. Clearly, the method of injuring that I have chosen
will not avail. Nonetheless, I have an intention to do an injury and that is one of the bedrock requirements of a crime.
Professor Friedman asks, quite sensibly, "Why pay the cost of
catching people and locking them up in order to deter behavior that we have no reason to deter?" 8
Chapter 8 introduces what is another important tool in
modern law and economics-game theory. Professor Friedman takes as one of his examples of the importance of game
theory the famous prisoner's dilemma and, having laid out
16. See David D. Friedman, Impossibility, Subjective Probability,and Punishment for Attempts, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 179 (1991).
17. See DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW'S ORDER 81-83 (2000).

18. The answer is that we punish impossible attempts because they deter
effective methods of inflicting injury by people who do not know which methods
are possible and which are impossible. See id. at 82.
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the fundamentals of that game, uses it to develop an excellent
legal example. 9 The other principal example that he uses is
that of bilateral monopoly. I find this to be a curious choice.
The idea of bilateral monopoly is both dated and, I believe,
not terribly helpful in legal analysis. Far better to take some
other conventional game-such as the battle of the sexes or
the hawk-dove game-to illustrate the central point for which
he brought in bilateral monopoly-namely, that some games
do not have unique solutions or any stable equilibria at all.
The law-and-economics literature is rife with examples of the
uses of game theory in legal analysis that go far beyond those
limned in this chapter." Another criticism that I would raise
of the material in this chapter is that the tools developed here
do not really figure later in the book.
Chapter 9 ("As Much as Your Life Is Worth") is yet another curious placement. This is a short walk through the issues of the valuation of human life. But again one wonders
why that material is treated here. It is an important issue,
no doubt, but it only arises in the legal context of tortious injury or in the determination of administrative agency regulatory standards and might, therefore, have been more instructively placed in those chapters.
These chapters conclude the introduction to the tools of
economic analysis that will then be applied to legal topics.
But before we turn to the law, there is an "intermezzo" in
which Professor Friedman gives a description of "The American Legal System in Brief." I found the coverage in this chapter to be odd. Who is this chapter for? It is far too brief to be
helpful to someone who knows nothing about the law and not
at all useful for someone who understands the American legal
system well. I suspect that the principal audiences are general readers and legal readers unfamiliar with the law and
economics. For the general audience, who can be expected to
know relatively little about the structure of the legal system,
Professor Friedman might have included material on such issues as how litigation commences, proceeds, and ends; the

19. See id. at 91-92.

20. For an overview see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE
LAW (1994).
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role of courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, and the
executive branch in creating and enforcing law; how courts, in
resolving private disputes, make law in our system; how our
system generally differs from the other legal systems of the
world; and so on. Moreover, Professor Friedman might have
helped those readers new to the law by laying out a general
framework of the topics he intended to pursue. That is, he
might have explained the selection of property, contracts,
torts, antitrust, and crime. A brief discussion of the distinction between private and public law would have been extremely useful.
When he finally gets to the substantive areas of the
law-in Chapter 10 ("Mine, Thine, and Ours: The Economics
of Property Law"), Professor Friedman is more than 100
pages into the book. There is much that is very clever and instructive here. For example, the discussion of whether we
should extend intellectual property rights to cover the English language is a wonderful issue and a really good teaching
device that I intend to use (with attribution).2 ' And the discussion of the economics of unitization of oil and gas fields is
a welcome deviation from the view that only private property
rights are efficiency-serving.
There are two topics that I found missing here. First,
how should property rights be assigned initially? Teachers in
this field frequently invoke the Coase Theorem to answer this
question: the assignment of property interests does not matter in circumstances in which transaction costs are zero because the interest will come to rest in the hands of the person
who values it the most. Second, there was no discussion of a
meta-principle for property law. I think that the literature
recognizes one-namely, that property law should seek to foster the efficient use of society's scarce resources. Stating such
a goal would allow one to organize the topics around that central theme, approaching each topic with regard to whether
the law in that area furthers or hinders the overall goal.
Thus, the issue of bundling rights22 would be easier to discuss
if one had that meta-principle at hand. The economic treat21. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 115-16.
22. See id. at 112-14.
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ment of the "touch and concern" doctrine is new and extremely interesting.
The decision to include a chapter on intellectual property
is very sound. As everyone near or in the law knows, that is
one of the hottest areas of the law, and so its inclusion is
likely to make the book seem more current than if the topic
were excluded. There are some wonderful insights heresuch as this gem about the difference between patent and
copyright law:
Copyright protection against literal copying creates a form
of property that is easy to define, cheap to enforce, relatively easy to transact over, and subject to no rent-seeking
problem. Hence we give copyright easily and for a long
term. Patent protection creates a form of property that is
hard to define, hard to enforce, costly to transact over, and
contains a potential inefficiency due to patent races leading to duplication and inefficiently early inventions.
23
Hence, we give patents grudgingly and for a short term.
However, there are some problems. There are two small
factual errors. Professor Friedman says that current copy24
rights last the "life of the author plus fifty years." Actually,

it is now the author's life plus seventy years. Also, Professor
Friedman says that "current patents (with some exceptions)
are for seventeen years,"25 when they are, in fact, for twenty
years from the date of filing. This is the sort of thing that
drives lawyers crazy. In this instance, it may cause otherwise
interested readers to close the book for good.
Chapter 12 deals with the economics of contract law. If
there is a wholly conventional chapter in the book, this is it.
Up to this point we have had sprightly and puckish titles.
But now there is a no-nonsense title--"The Economics of Contract." And the treatment of the topic is more comprehensive
and more conventional than anything we have had heretofore-what defines a contract, what can go wrong in the formation or the performance of a contractual promise, and what
remedies are available for a disappointed contractual party.
There are some cutting-across-the-corners in the discussion of
23. Id. at 135-36.
24. Id. at 131.
25. Id. at 133.
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contract remedies, as in the discussion of expectation and reliance damages. 6 The issue of reliance damages is notoriously difficult, so much so that when I teach the economics of
contract remedies I wave my hands in the air and tell the
students that they ought not venture there: madness awaits
those who delve too deeply into the economics of reliance
damages. It is puzzling that the issue of liquidated damages
does not figure in the discussion. That is such a marvelous
topic because the economic analysis of this area is so starkly
at odds with the settled legal analysis.
Chapter 13 is a step back into the world of oddities"Marriage, Sex, and Babies." I found the discussion here both
annoying and incomplete. The discussion of why societies
tend to outlaw prostitution even though there are no obvious
victims27 is the sort of thing that gives economists a bad
name. The answer is that: "[llaws making sex outside of marriage illegal improve the bargaining position of women who
want to get married, or stay married, or to maintain a strong
bargaining position within marriage. Hence it is rational for
such women to support such laws.""
My wife is rational, and so, I trust, am I. Part of my being rational alerts me not to suggest to her that her current
(and long-standing) opposition to legalizing prostitution rests
on her desire to improve her chances in the marriage market.
My wife already affects a low opinion of my ability to grasp
the real work. If I were to ask her whether this theory made
sense to her, she would file that question away as further
reason to doubt my good sense. This chapter has some interesting tidbits, such as an account of Professor Margaret
Brinig's wonderful story of the origin of wedding rings. But it
sometimes raises issues that it cannot resolve, such as the
reasons for the disturbing rise in out-of-wedlock births, or issues, such as the reasons for the illegality of prostitution, that
seem more than merely whimsical. However, the story of the
Friedman family's trip to the Humane Society to adopt a cat
is worth the price of the book. "
26.
27.
28.
29.

See id. at 166.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 177-78.
Id. at 177.
See id. at 184-85.
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Chapter 14 is another no-nonsense, plain vanilla treatment ("Tort Law"). Again there is no meta-principle that Professor Friedman uses to organize the material. That is unfortunate because the literature has provided one: tort liability
should seek to minimize the social costs of accidents. Moreover, there is something to be said about why tort law exists-transaction costs prevent parties from bargaining before
an accident occurs, and it may be better to have one party
rather than both take precaution-but that was not mentioned in the chapter. Nonetheless, this is the most comprehensive and the most solid, in terms of coverage of the standard literature, of the chapters in the text. The bilateral and
unilateral precautions that distinguish strict liability and
negligence are here. Professor Friedman discusses the activity level effect in a clear and novel way, showing how negligence may not appropriately induce precaution in that regard
but strict liability will. I am here, as before, troubled by the
fact that there are no citations to the scholarly literature that
generated these findings. The chapter contains a long section
on punitive damages"° in the course of which Professor
Friedman makes some very interesting points about when
and how, in theory, punitive damages should be awarded:
[P]unitive damages are awarded for torts in relatively
elastic supply, ordinary damages for torts in relatively
inelastic supply, and doing so is at least roughly efficient.
Ordinary damages undercompensate, because they contain no probability multiplier-and they should undercompensate, since the optimal punishment, allowing for
the cost of imposing it, is less than damage done if the
supply of offenses is sufficiently elastic. Punitive damages
overcompensate, and should, since, the optimal punishment is more than the damage done if the supply of offenses is sufficiently elastic."
But I believe that he is wrong to suggest that punitive
damages have become more common recently." Most lawyers
to whom I have spoken cannot recall an award of punitive
damages in their jurisdiction, and, more importantly, there is
30. See id. at 206-11.
31. Id. at 209-10.
32. See id. at 207.
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objective evidence that shows the rarity and relative modesty
of punitive damages awards."3
The final seventy-five pages of the book covers the issues
of antitrust and crime. I found this selection half-puzzling.
The unpuzzling part is the coverage of the economic analysis
of crime. That is one of the great triumphs of law and economics, and Professor Friedman's treatment of the Becker
model and its extensions is excellent. There are some very interesting moments in these pages-for example, the discussions of crime in the Icelandic sagas 4 and of eighteenth century criminal prosecutions in England. 5 The puzzling part is
the decision to cover antitrust law. Modern law and economics distinguishes itself, in part, by moving beyond the more
obvious connections between the two fields, such areas as antitrust law, government regulation, taxation, and the computation of damages. I would have thought that someone would
include something on antitrust only if they meant to use the
Microsoft case as a device for talking about network externalities, path dependencies, and other novel methods of monopolization. But the coverage in Law's Order is really just a
quick (and able) summary of standard antitrust materialvertical integration and tie-in sales.
I would have been more content if Professor Friedman
had concluded his work with some writing on current developments in law and economics and some sensible speculation
about the future. There are hot topics in law and economicssuch as the importance of empirical work, the interaction between law and social norms," and behavioral law and economics. 7 Unfortunately, there is almost nothing about these
33. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 4, at 356. Punitive damages may be
thought to be far more common and far larger than they, in fact, are because of
the availability heuristic: when a court awards a large sum in punitive damages, that fact tends to be reported, but when punitives are not awarded or are
very modest in size, they are not reported. See id.
34. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 263-67.
35. See id. at 267-74.
36. There is some material about norms, principally about Ellickson's study
of Shasta County practices, in Friedman, Chapter 17, at 274-77. See Robert C.
Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986); see also ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL
NORMS (2000).
37. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 6; BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS

20011

BOOK REVIEW

657

or any other recent developments in the field.
B. The Text-Internet Link
One of the fascinating innovations of this work is its links
to a website (http://www.best.coml/-ddfr/). Most significantly,
the text of the entire book is available at that website and is
so arranged that it looks exactly like the book. It is a little
awkward to read a book on a computer screen, but if one feels
inclined to do so, it is comforting and useful that the pagina8
tion of the text and of the on-line versions is identical.
This innovation works as follows. The margins of Law's
Order contain five different icons that direct the reader to
specific points on his website. The icons, as explained in an
introductory chapter, indicate a website reference to additional commentary on the text material, citations to books
and articles discussed in the text, citations to cases, mathematical elaborations of the textual material, and links to a
webbed book or article.
This innovation is, I think, exciting, and because I am a
great proponent of using the Internet as an educational tool, I
had great hopes for the combination of text and web. So, I am
sorry to report that the innovation doesn't work very well.
There are four problems. First, I had difficulty remembering
what each of the icons meant. They do not occur frequently
enough that even an attentive reader is likely to remember
what each icon means-a case?, an article?, a webbed book?
In point of fact, I came to recognize that even though I
couldn't remember exactly what each icon meant, all I needed
to recall was that a symbol in the margin meant that there
was something on the website to consult. A second problem
was that to make the most of the iconic references to material
on the website, one has to read the book while in front of a
computer connected to the Internet or read the on-line version of the book, which I do not find an attractive option. I
(Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
38. One can imagine the convenience of having the web version readily
available if one is away from home and wanted to consult the text through an
Internet Service Provider or if one wanted to consult some aspect of the book
while working at the office, where the Friedman website would be available
through a high-speed connection.
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read the vast majority of the book while I was not in front of a
computer. This necessitated my noting which pages had
symbolic references to material on the website so that I could
consult the material when next I was at a computer. This is
only a second-best solution, for when I did get to a computer, I
frequently could not recall the text material for which the
website reference was to be further enlightening. But from
the website I could, of course, flip over to the webbed version
of the book to refresh my memory. Third, some web material
is nothing more than the appropriate citations to the articles
that Professor Friedman is discussing in the text. In point of
fact, the majority of that material should simply have been
put in footnotes in the text. 39 Fourth, and finally, some of the
iconic categories were hardly used at all and might have been
absorbed into a broader category. For example, one of the
icons is for mathematical elaborations. It was a good idea to
relegate those elaborations to somewhere other than the text
because many readers would find mathematics as welcome as
long textual passages in Hungarian. But the first mathematical icon did not appear until page 159, and there are only
five mathematical icons in the entire book.
C. The Audience
Earlier I spoke of the state of law and economics within
the legal academy and the disjunction between the legal
academy and the legal profession. I raised those issues because I believe that they are relevant to an issue that troubled me as I read this book: to whom is this book addressed?
I have touched on this matter lightly above and now want to
explore it further.
39. Non-lawyers frequently criticize lawyers for the vast number of footnotes they use. I do not want to take a stand on the issue of whether there are
too many, too few, or just the right number of footnotes in the typical law review
article, book, or case. But I do think that Professor Friedman's book has too few
footnotes-namely, zero. Whatever other virtues there may be to the innovative
link between the text and the web that Professor Friedman attempts in Law's
Order, there is still much to be said for retaining the footnote if for no other
purpose than to cite sources. Note that I used this footnote-fittingly, I hopefor a purpose other than citing to literature. But perhaps I can make my point
by urging interested readers to see ANTHONY GRAFTON, THE FOOTNOTE: A
CURIOUS HISTORY (1999).
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My instinct is that the audiences for whom this book is
likely to be of most interest are economists and the general
reader. General readers-those unfamiliar both with economics and with the law-are, I suspect, the ideal audience.
This is because the text is non-technical; it is well written; it
treats an important topic and does so in a sprightly fashion.
Economists might constitute another plausible audience: they
tend not to know about the revolution that law and economics
has effected within legal scholarship (and, to a lesser degree,
within the practice of law) but to be interested in these general developments.
To address the audience issue in the negative, I do not
think that Law's Order is the book to put in the hands of
practicing lawyers, law professors, and law students who express an interest in learning about law and economics. More
precisely, if one were to recommend this book to that group, I
would do so selectively, recommending some but not all of the
chapters, in line with my comments in Part II.A. I am also
skeptical of whether this book would be an entirely successful
text for an introductory course in law and economics. For instance, the citations to the literature would be more important in a course than for the general reader, and their absence would limit the utility of the book as a text.
III. CONCLUSION
Law's Order is a wonderful introduction to the most important innovation in legal scholarship of the last century,
law and economics. There have been some remarkable other
introductions-most notably, Judge Posner's magisterial
work-but not only is there room for more, there is a place for
Professor Friedman's contribution. He speaks in a distinctive
voice, with a slightly new perspective, and with a puckish and
infectious good humor.

